Responsa for Bava Batra 277:15
אמר ליה תנינא נשאו גדולות ישאו קטנות מאי לאו נשאו גדולות לבעל ישאו קטנות מבעל
But surely, we learnt, THOSE WHO ARE OF AGE ARE NOT TO BE SUPPORTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MINORS! — Our Mishnah [refers] to [those who are] without a calling.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H] (edd. [H]), 'a man at ease'; one who is not in any way engaged in the improvement of the estate or in the increase of its value. ');"><sup>43</sup></span> [In the case of] one without a calling, [is this not] obvious!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he is of no use to the management or maintenance of the estate, what possible claim can he have upon the general funds in respect of his personal dress? ');"><sup>44</sup></span> — [Since] it might have been assumed that [the brothers] desire that he should not be disgraced<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Through the wearing of unbecoming clothes, and would thus agree to beat the expense. ');"><sup>45</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
A. Authorities differ regarding the rights of a husband over his wife's dowry. Some authorities decide that a husband has the rights of a buyer [who is not responsible for the seller's debts] while others hold that his rights are those of an heir [who is liable for the debts of his benefactor]. Since we can not choose between these conflicting opinions, we allow the money to remain in the hands of the present possessor. And since L has no money and will have no money till she be widowed or divorced, there is no sense in exacting an oath from her. We give B a written verdict, however, to the effect that in case L be widowed or divorced she then must take an oath denying B's claim or pay that debt.
SOURCES: Am II, 25, 27, 29. Cf. Agudah B. B. 185.
Teshuvot Maharam
A. A's unmarried sons are not entitled to marriage gifts. The estate is to be divided equally among the sons.
SOURCES: L. 181.
Teshuvot Maharam
Rabbi Perez took issue with Rabbi Meir quoting Alfasi's decision that the ordinance of Usha — which ruled that a person who divided all of his property among his children may derive his sustenance as well as that of his wife's from such property — was not accepted.
Rabbi Meir reproved Rabbi Perez for resorting to Alfasi when the Talmud specifically decided that the ordinance of Usha was not accepted. R. Meir contended, however, that only that part of the ordinance was not accepted which gave the right to the donor, and to his wife while he was alive, to derive their sustenance from the property he had given away; while the rule that the widow may collect her sustenance or her ketubah from such property after the donor's death, was accepted before the ordinance of Usha was promulgated, and has remained in force independently of such ordinance.
Meanwhile L's relatives have written to Rabbi Meir asking for his decsion in this matter. R. Meir answered that he usually refrained from sending legal opinions to litigants, or to their relatives, and confined his responses to judges. But, when Rabbi Perez, in his second letter, gave the names of the litigants, R. Meir realized that the letters from L's relatives dealt with the same case. R. Meir recalled that among these letters was found a letter from Rabbi Asher which explained the circumstances of the gift mentioned above. Therefore, R. Meir added (in his second letter to Rabbi Perez) that since according to Rabbi Asher's letter, the donor mentioned the contingency of death when he summoned Rabbi Asher, he therefore made the gift to his son causa mortis (cf. B. B. 151a), and a widow is undoubtedly entitled to collect her ketubah from causa mortis gifts.
SOURCES: Cr. 192; Am II, 46–7; cf. Hag. Maim. to Ishut 16, 4; Mord. Ket. 161. Cf. Agudah B.M. 29; Moses Minz, Responsa 66.